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Abstract
In the present article, I provide a simple urban theory where agents do not bid
for land. In absence of this baseline mechanism, I show that the spatial allocation of
agents is governed by a Nash equilibrium. I underline the role of asymmetric local
congestion effects in insuring the existence and the uniqueness of such an equilibrium.
I then use this new framework to account for spatial variation in unemployment within
big cities. Namely, applying this setting in an urban search model, I demonstrate that
the obtained framework can generate a large number of new city configurations in
which the local unemployment rate behaves differently. I also determine conditions for
which each configuration may appear. I finally prove, the existence and the uniqueness
of a labor market equilibrium for each urban pattern and I draw a link between the
latter and the allocation of workers throughout space.
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1 Introduction
The bid-rent theory, determining how land prices and housing demand vary across space,
has become the cornerstone in urban economics. In a world where distinct groups of
individuals have an intrinsic use of land, this theory states that space is allocated to the
use that bids the most for it. Accordingly, land use in a given location generally is of one
type. Land use can be of several types if, and only if, at least, two populations share the
same bid-rent function. This particular case can never occur (see, for example, Mossay and
Picard (2013)) or can prevail under a very specific parameterization (see Fujita and Ogawa
(1980, 1982) and Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002)). This also involves that segregation,
a state in which agents get separated into different neighborhoods, commonly arises as
an outcome. Other configurations as, for instance, integrated situations where different
populations of individuals share the same places of residence, rarely emerge.
Though it is fair to observe that cities show spatial sorting of inhabitants, other empir-
ical facts totally debunk the existence of cities organized according to concentric rings of
land use. For instance, it has been well established that the location of employed and un-
employed workers are strongly inter-dispersed (see, amonger others, Wheeler (1998), Topa
(2001, Figures 1-3), Gobillon and Selod (2007, Carte 1), Dujardin, Selod and Thomas
(2008, Figure 2), Dujardin and Gofette-Nagot (2010, Figure 1)). Namely, spatial data dis-
play a large amount of heterogeneity in terms of unemployment dispersion and document
that segregation is the exception rather than the rule. Unfortunately, theoretical literature
has been unable to account for this spatial intra-variation in the unemployment rate (see
Zenou (2009a)). The latter mostly pays attention to segregated cities where there are only
two local unemployment rates: either 0 % or 100 % (see, within a large literature, Wasmer
and Zenou (2002), Smith and Zenou (2003), Kawata and Sato (2012), Xiao (2013)).1 This
is explained by the fact that the models of this literature suppose that land is driven by
bid-rent principle which, as previously mentioned, prevents the existence of cases where
unemployed and employed workers live together.
The present article aims at accounting for spatial dispersion in the unemployment rate
within cities by providing an alternative urban model where agents do not bid for land. My
theoretical point is to highlight that, in the absence of this standard mechanism, the spatial
distribution of workers is driven by a Nash equilibrium and to show the relative importance
of asymmetric local congestion effects in determining the existence and the uniqueness of
such an equilibrium. Moreover, my objective is also to study the new city configurations
that may emerge within this framework. Therefore, the purpose of this article is qualitative
1Only Wasmer and Zenou (2006) find a configuration where two segregated areas of the unemployed
surround a zone where the unemployed and the employed co-exist.
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in nature and not quantitative. Thence, I operate in two steps.
First, I study the main characteristics of a standard urban model but where agents
do not bid for space. To this end, I use Cirant (2014) and I extend the framework of
Cardaliaguet (2012) to several populations of agents. More precisely, I develop a game
with infinite number of agents sharing a common set of strategies and being distributed
(for the sake of simplicity) in two different groups. Each player, whatever their group, has
to choose a unique strategy maximizing a payoff function. The key feature of this game is
that the utility functions depend on the selected strategy and on the density of other agents
playing this strategy. I then carry out the study (focusing on existence and uniqueness) of
a Nash equilibrium when the number of individuals becomes infinite.
The central result of this part is to demonstrate that a unique Nash equilibrium exists
if utility functions exhibit asymmetric congestion (or competition) effects. In other words,
existence and uniqueness hinge on two conditions. On the one hand, players’ payoff func-
tions have to decrease with the density of other players. Such preferences express local
congestion effects. On the other hand, these negative local externalities must be not the
same for both populations of players.
Second, I use this methodology to build and examine the properties of a simple urban
model with endogenous unemployment. I specifically consider a monocentric city with a
continuum of locations filled with an infinite number of firms, absent landlords and work-
ers. Search in the city is random. Firms are exogenously located in the city center, do not
consume any space and compensate workers for their spatial costs (see Zenou (2009b)). Ab-
sent landlords own houses that are exogenously supplied by a competitive market. Workers
have hyperbolic preferences as in Mossay and Picard (2011, 2013) and as in Blanchet et al.
(2012). They choose the location and size of their dwellings knowing that they would face
high relocation costs (see Zenou (2003, 2006, 2009b)). They can also remain in two different
states : either employed or unemployed. When they are employed, they commute daily to
the city center in order to work. When they are unemployed, they occasionally commute
to the center to look for a job. Another difference between workers is that employed work-
ers incur an additional cost to live with other employed workers. This asymmetric local
congestion effect can be interpreted as a congestion effect in road or a competition effect
in the consumption of neighborhood goods.
In this setup, workers face a trade-off. They have an incentive to live close to the city
center to avoid paying high transport costs, but they also anticipate that these locations
are precisely those to which a high number of other inhabitants will reside in. As a conse-
quence, they also are encouraged to live in remote places of residence to escape congestion.
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This induces that workers endogenously select a place of residence according to their spatial
preferences and the strategy of other worker who are captured by the residential density
of the unemployed and employed. Consequently, the allocation of workers in space is no
longer related to the bid-rent theory but with the Nash equilibrium described above. It
determines an endogenous spatial distribution of unemployed and employed workers and so
an endogenous unemployment dispersion. Last, equivalently to Zenou (2009a) , wages, job
creation and unemployment are determined according to the labor market. The latter is
modeled by a search and matching equilibrium (i.e. Nash bargaining, job creation equation
and Beveridge curve).
Within this environment, I show that many new urban configurations can appear. The
city can be: purely integrated if both groups of workers live together and in the same
proportions; segregated if populations of workers get separated into two different parts
of the city; integrated when employed and unemployed workers share the same places
of residence but in different proportions; incompletely and purely integrated if the city
is purely integrated into a part of space, whereas in other zones, the city is segregated;
incompletely integrated if the city is integrated into a zone of the city while in other areas, it
is segregated. Among incompletely and purely integrated cities, two sub-configurations can
be found: a central core of mixed workers surrounded by a segregated part of unemployed
or employed workers. Likewise, among incompletely integrated cities, four sub-patterns can
be pointed out: a central core of employed workers surrounded by a peripheral integrated
ring of workers, a central core of mixed-ring workers surrounded by a peripheral segregated
part of employed or unemployed workers and both a central core and a peripheral ring of
segregated areas separated by an intermediate ring of mixed workers. In each configuration
and sub-configuration, the behavior of the local unemployment rate is different. In purely
integrated cities, it is uniformly distributed. In segregated cities, it is degenerated (i.e. 0
% or 100 %). In integrated cities, it is continuously but non-uniformly distributed. In
incompletely and purely integrated cities, it is uniformly distributed in the core of the
space and then degenerated in the fringes of the city. In incompletely integrated cities, it
is continuously distributed in some areas and degenerated in other parts of the city.
I then emphasize very simple and analytical conditions for which each urban situation
can emerge as a balance between agglomeration and dispersion forces. By studying these
conditions, I demonstrate that the predominance of one of these patterns relies on the rela-
tive importance of the employment rate, the worker’s search effort, the worker’s bargaining
power, congestion between employed workers, preference for land and transport costs.
To conclude, for each urban configuration, I prove the existence and the uniqueness of
a labor market equilibrium (i.e. an equilibrium labor market tightness and an equilibrium
unemployment rate). I also characterize the link between the outcome of this labor market
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equilibrium and the spatial distributions of workers. For example, in the present model, the
intra-variation of the local unemployment rate does not impact the global unemployment
rate of the city. Only the spatial concentration of employed workers plays a significant role.
A direct consequence of this fact is that segregated cities always show lower unemployment
rates than integrated ones.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical game where the
role of local congestion effects is underlined. Section 3 presents the urban search model.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Population Games, Nash Equilibrium and Local Con-
gestion Effects
This article is based on one particular form of Nash equilibrium. As the latter is implicitly
presented but not studied in urban economics, I briefly highlight some useful definitions
and results using Cirant (2014). I notably describe a population game where individuals
are engaged with intra- and inter-group local interactions. I analyze the characteristics
(existence and uniqueness) of the Nash equilibrium of such a game when the number
of agents becomes very large. Technically speaking, this game consists in extending the
framework of Cardaliaguet (2012, Section 2) to several populations of players. All material
developed in this section is also related to routing games (see Haurie and Marcotte (1985)),
large crowding games (see Milchtaich (2000)) and mean field games (see Lasry and Lions
(2007)).
2.1 Setup
Let X be a compact subset of R and M (X ) be the set of absolutely continuous Borel
probability measures on X (with respect to the Lebersques measure) denoted by µ and
having density also denoted by µ in C0(X ) with C0(X ) the set of continuous functions.
This set is endowed with the Kantorowich-Rubinstein distance:
d(µ, µ˜) = sup
{∫
X
g(x)d(µ− µ˜)(x) : g ∈ C0,1(X ), Lip(g) ≤ 1
}
(1)
where C0,1(X ) is the set of continuous and differentiable functions on X and with Lip(g)
the minimal Lipschitz constant for g. This implies that d metricizes the weak-∗ convergence
on M(X ) and M(X ) is compact for d. Subsequently, I consider a continuum of agents
distributed into two different groups index k ∈ {1, 2}.2 In a given population k, players are
2A generalization for k ∈ N∗+ is possible without any difficulty.
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homogenous players and have to choose a unique action from X a common set of actions.
In order to do so, they maximize a continuous payoff function Ak : X × (0,∞)
2 → R that
depends on x their strategies and µk(x) the density of individuals (in each population)
playing the same strategy:
Ak
(
xik, µ1(x
i
k), µ2(x
i
k)
)
(2)
with xik the strategy of player i that belongs to group k. For example, one could consider
the following linear case:
A1 (x, µ1(x), µ2(x)) = a− tx− φ11µ1(x)− φ12µ2(x)A2 (x, µ1(x), µ2(x)) = a− tx− φ21µ1(x)− φ22µ2(x) (3)
with a, t, φ11, φ12, φ21, φ22 ∈ R. Finally, note that, if Ak decreases with the proportion of
other individuals, agents are encouraged to play differently. Such preferences reflect what
is commonly called local congestion effects.
2.2 Equilibrium: Definition, Existence and Uniqueness
A Nash equilibrium, in the sense that all agents whatever their groups play best response,
is given by:3
Definition 1 A vector (µ∗1, µ
∗
2) ∈M (X )
2 is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if:∫
X
Ak (x, µ
∗
1(x), µ
∗
2(x)) dµ
∗
k(x) = sup
µ∈M(X )
∫
X
Ak (x, µ
∗
1(x), µ
∗
2(x)) dµ(x) (4)
In line with the game theory literature, an equilibrium is a state where the payoff function
Ak is maximized if the density of players in population k is non-zero. Put differently, the
equilibrium can be re-written as:
Supp(µ∗k) ⊆ argmax
x∈X
Ak (x, µ
∗
1(x), µ
∗
2(x)) (5)
For the sake of simplicity, I will use this standard formulation (see, among others, Sandholm
(2001)) to characterize the spatial equilibrium of the urban search model. Now, let me
tackle the question of the existence and uniqueness of this equilibrium. More precisely, I
get:
Proposition 1 There exists at least one vector (µ∗1, µ
∗
2) ∈M (X )
2 satisfying (4).
3This Nash equilibrium can be found by taking the limit of a static game (see Cardaliaguet (2012,
Theorem 2.4 and Theorem 2.7). However, it is also possible to derive it from other frameworks. For
example, equilibrium (3) can be viewed as a stationary mean field game: see Cirant (2014) or take Theorem
2.8 and see Section 2.7 in Lasry and Lions (2007). It is also related to models of interacting agents: take
equation (16) in Lemoy, Bertin and Jensen (2011) and set T → 0.
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Additionally, uniqueness occurs under the following assumptions:
Proposition 2 Suppose that:
∫
X
2∑
k=1
Ak (x, µ
∗
1(x), µ
∗
2(x))−Ak (x, µ˜1(x), µ˜2(x)) d (µ
∗
1 − µ˜1) (x) < 0 (6)
for all µ∗1 = µ˜1 and µ
∗
2 = µ˜2, then, there is at most a vector (µ
∗
1, µ
∗
2) ∈ M (X )
2 satisfying
(4).
This Proposition is in line with Lasry and Lions (2007) and identical to the one of Cirant
(2014, Theorem 5.1). Moreover, using Lagrange Theorem and assuming that A1 and A2
are differentiable, it appears that a sufficient condition for (6) is that:
A(x, µ1, µ2) + A(x, µ1, µ2)
T is negative semi-definite (7)
with:
A(x, µ1, µ2) =
(
∂A1(x,µ1(x),µ2(x))
∂µ1(x)
∂A1(x,µ1(x),µ2(x))
∂µ2(x)
∂A2(x,µ1(x),µ2(x))
∂µ1(x)
∂A2(x,µ1(x),µ2(x))
∂µ2(x)
)
(8)
and A(x, µ1, µ2)
T the transpose of the matrix A(x, µ1, µ2). For example, if I consider the
linear case (3), this sufficient condition holds if: φ11 = φ21 = φ22 = −φ and φ12 = −φ− ϕ
with φ, ϕ > 0 two constants. However, notice that the condiciont is not verified for the
symmetric case: φ11 = φ12 = φ21 = φ22 = −φ. Thus and inuitively, uniqueness emerges if
two conditions are completed:
1. The payoff functions are negatively correlated with the density of other players:
∂Ak(x,µ1(x),µ2(x))
∂µk(x)
< 0. This second condition asserts that uniqueness prevails if utility
functions exhibit local congestion effects.
2. The matrix A is not symmetric. This indicates that local interactions between indi-
viduals are asymmetric:
∂Aj(x,µ1(x),µ2(x))
∂µk(x)
6=
∂Aj(x,µ1(x),µ2(x))
∂µk(x)
. Equivalently, multiplicity
appears when players are symetric in terms of their loss from intra- and inter-groups
interactions:
∂Aj(x,µ1(x),µ2(x))
∂µk(x)
=
∂Aj(x,µ1(x),µ2(x))
∂µk(x)
.
I will use this methodology in an urban search model.4 More accurately, I will show
that the standard urban search model, but only where space is not driven by the bid-rent
theory, shares identical elements with the previously framework. Hence, the appropriate
equilibrium will be the one expressed in equation (4) and existence and uniqueness of such
equilibrium will be provided by Proposition 1 and Proposition 2.
4This setting can also be applied to many other economic fields: macroeconomics, labor economics,
Schelling models... See Boitier and Vatan (2014) for a example in international trade.
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2.3 Link with Urban Economics
In this subsection, I show that the previous game corresponds to the standard urban land
use model but where agents do not bid for land. For this purpose, let X denote a featureless
space that hosts two populations (indexed k) of workers. In a given population k, there is
a unit mass of homogenous workers associated with the following continuous function:
Zk(σk(x), ζk(x)) (9)
and the following budget constraint:
σk(x) +R(x)ζk(x) = Ik(x) = yk − t(x) (10)
with σk(x) the amount of composite consumer good and ζk(x) the size of houses, R(x) the
rent per unit of land, yk a fixed exogenous income, t(x) the transport costs and Ik(x) the
net revenue. In this mere environment, they make two decisions so that:
max
x,ζk(x)
{Zk(Ik(x)−R(x)ζk(x), ζk(x))} (11)
I solve this problem in two steps. In a first step and for x fixed, maximizing program (11)
with respect to ζk(x), I obtain the classical Marshallian demand function:
ζ∗k(x) = h
∗ (Ik(x), R(x)) (12)
and the (continuous) indirect utility function:
Ak(Ik(x), R(x)) = Zk(Ik(x)−R(x)ζ
∗
k(x), ζ
∗
k(x)) (13)
with h∗ a continuous function that increases with Ii(x) and decreases with R(x) (i.e. land is
a normal good). In a second step, for ζ∗i (x) given and noting that the land market clears:
5
ζ∗1 (x)µ1(x) + ζ
∗
2 (x)µ2(x) = 1 (14)
the rent per unit of land can be re-written as:
R∗(x) = g∗ (I1(x), I2(x), µ1(x), µ2(x)) (15)
where g∗ is a continuous function. In addition, combining equation (13) and equation (15),
I get:
max
x
Ak(x, µ1(x), µ2(x)) = max
x
{Zk(Ik(x)−R
∗(x)ζ∗k(x), ζ
∗
k(x))} (16)
Thence, the suited equilibrium associated with problem (16) is the above Nash equilibrium
and if A1 and A2 comply with conditions in Proposition 2, this equilibrium is unique.
5I suppose that land intensity equals to 1. This does not determine the nature of the results.
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Last but not least, notice that the standard urban model only makes an extra hypothesis.
Namely, it is assumed that:
R∗(x) = max {Ψ(A∗1, x),Ψ(A
∗
2, x), RA} (17)
with RA the agricultural rent and so that
Ψ(A∗k, x) = max
σk(x),ζk(x)
{
yk − t(x)− σk(x)
ζk(x)
|Zk(σk(x), ζk(x)) = A
∗
k ∈ R
}
(18)
where Ψ(A∗k, x) is the bid-rent function of workers belonging to population k and A
∗
k the
equilibrium utility for population k.
3 Urban Search Model without the Bid Rent Theory
The model considered hereafter uses the methodology outlined in Section 2. Although the
latter is based on general functions, in what follows, I will pin down linear functional forms
for Ak (see equation (3)). This will help understand the complex economic interactions
at play. Thereby, the analytical model here can be seen as an illustration. However, the
nature of the results would be the same with general functions unless the model obtained
is more cumbersome and adds intractability (i.e. is only numerically solvable).
3.1 Environment
Let X = [0, 1] be a linear and closed city composed of a continuum of locations denoted by
x ∈ X . The city is monocentric: x = 0 is the Central Business District (hereafter CBD)
where all firms are exogenously located. Accordingly, x also represents distance to city
center and access to jobs.
3.1.1 Job Matching
The labor market under study gathers a continuum of (ex ante) homogenous, infinitely
lived and risk neutral unemployed with mass u ∈ [0, 1] and a continuum of (ex ante) iden-
tical, infinitely lived and risk neutral employed represented by a mass e = 1 − u ∈ [0, 1].6
As a result, u (respectively e) stands for the global unemployment (respectively employ-
ment) rate. These workers are spatially dispersed into the city following two endogenous
6Unemployed workers are job seekers (i.e. no on-the-job search).
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distributions µU , µW ∈M(X ):

µU : X → R+∫
X
µU(x)dx = u
µW : X → R+∫
X
µW (x)dx = e = 1− u
(19)
where µU(x) is the density of unemployed workers located in x and µW (x) is the density of
employees residing in x. There also exists a continuum of vacant jobs with mass v ∈ [0, 1]
where v is referred to as the vacancy rate. Job seekers find a job and vacancies are filled
according to two random processes. These processes are governed by a matching function
with constant return to scales denoted by m(su, v) with s ∈]0, 1] the exogenous average
search effort of unemployed workers. Hence, in this city, the job filling rate is q(θ) = m(su,v)
v
with θ = v
su
the labor market tightness in effort units and such that ∂q(θ)
∂θ
< 0. Likewise,
the job finding rate is f(θ) = s
s
m(su,v)
u
= sθq(θ) so that ∂f(θ)
∂θ
> 0 and where s = s is the
search effort of unemployed.7
3.1.2 Firms
Firms are placed in x = 0, consume no space and can remain in two different situations:
either productive or unproductive. If a firm is productive, it is associated with a worker
residing in location x and makes the following instantaneous profit:
J(x) = y − ω(x) (20)
with y ∈ R∗+ the worker’s productivity, ω(x) ∈ R
∗
+ the worker’s wage and so that, for every
x in Supp(µW ), y > ω(x). Since jobs are destroyed according to an exogenous rate δ ∈ R
∗
+
referred to as the separation rate, the expected profit of a productive firm (i.e. a filled job)
that employs a worker located in x denoted by J (x) satisfies a Bellman equation:
ρJ (x) = J(x)− δ [J (x)− V ] (21)
where ρ is a parameter that captures the preference for the present, V is the expected profit
of an unproductive firm and J (x)−V is the local firm’s surplus. If a firm is unproductive,
it is unfilled by a worker. As a consequence, it posts a unique vacancy at cost κ ∈ R∗+. As
the vacant job is filled at rate q(θ), the instantaneous profit for an unproductive firm (i.e.
a vacancy) is:
V = −κ (22)
and the expected profit of an unproductive firm is:
ρV = V + q(θ) [J (x)− V ] (23)
7m also complies with Inada’s conditions: lim
θ→+∞
f(θ) = lim
θ→0
q(θ) = +∞ and lim
θ→0
f(θ) = lim
θ→+∞
q(θ) = 0.
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3.1.3 Workers
Workers decide how much to consume a place of residence and can remain in two different
states: either employed or unemployed. If a worker is unemployed, it is endowed with
hyperbolic preferences à la Mossay and Picard (2011, 2013):
Z(σU(x), ζU(x)) = σU(x)−
φ
2ζU(x)
(24)
with σU(x) ∈ R
∗
+ (respectively ζU(x) ∈ R
∗
+) the amount of composite good (respectively
land) consumed by an unemployed person placed in x and φ ∈ R∗+ the preference for land.
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It also earns a level of benefits z ∈ R∗+ such that y > z, goes to the CBD to look for a
job incurring linear transport costs st ∈ R∗+, faces a rate f(θ) to have a job, pays R(x) per
unit of land to absent landlords and bears high relocation costs.9 In this case, its budget
constraint is:
σU(x) + ζU(x)R(x) + stx = z (25)
and the expected utility of an unemployed worker in x denoted by U(x) is determined by
the following Bellman equation:
ρU(x) = Z(σU(x), ζU(x)) + f(θ) [W(x)− U(x)] (26)
with W(x) the expected utility of an unemployed worker located in x and W(x) − U(x)
the local worker’s surplus. If workers are employed, they share the same utility function
than the unemployed one:
Z(σW (x), ζW (x)) = σW (x)−
φ
2ζW (x)
(27)
with σW (x) ∈ R
∗
+ (respectively ζW (x) ∈ R
∗
+) the amount of composite good (respectively
land) consumed by an employed person residing in x. They are also endowed with one unit
of labor, a level of productivity y, earns a wage ω(x), faces high relocation costs, a rate
δ of losing his job, commutes to the CBD to work incurring linear transport costs t per
8Hyperbolic preferences are a special case of quasi-linear preferences and so the income effect in the land
consumption is eliminated (see Zenou (2009a) for other models that tackle the question of city configuration
and where the income effect is ruled out in the consumption of land). I use these particular preferences for
the sake of simplicity. They have the convenient property that the instantaneous indirect utility linearly
depends on residential density of workers. This simplification helps derive the important analytical results
in this article. In the case of other quasi-linear utilities and non quasi-linear utilities, the model remains
true but is bulky so that it is only numerically solvable.
9Unemployment benefits is assumed to be exogenously financed by landlords. This assumption could
be relaxed without any difficulty.
Following Zenou (2003, 2006, 2009b) and Kawata and Sato (2012), high relocation costs imply that
once the agent is located, it sticks on this place forever. However, note that results are unchanged if this
assumption is ruled out.
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unit of distance and pays R(x) per unit of land to absent landlords. Thence, their budget
constraint is:
σW (x) +R(x)ζW (x) + tx+ ϕµW (x) = ω(x) (28)
and the expected utility of an employed worker in x denoted byW(x) satisfies the following
Bellman equation:
ρW(x) = Z(σW (x), ζW (x))− δ [W(x)− U(x)] (29)
Another difference between the employed and the unemployed workers is that the employed
ones bear ϕµW (x) (with ϕ > 0) an additional cost emphasizing a local negative effect. Even
if I do not micro-found this neighborhood externality, the latter is quite intuitive. It can be
viewed as competition effect in the consumption of congestible city goods or local ameni-
ties (see Fujita (1989, Chap 6.5) and the notion of neighborhood goods). It can also be
interpreted as a congestion in road (see Chu (1995) and Grauwin and al. (2011) for an
example of congestion in road modeled by local densities of agents). Unemployed workers
are free of congestion and employed ones do not value unemployed workers as competitors
because unemployed workers can use transports or amenities during outside rush hours.
These relations are also empirically observed. For example, it is fair to note that the drop in
traffic congestion since the 2007 crisis has been due to the large increase in unemployment.
Other alternatives could be considered. Among others, I could introduce more complex in-
teractions between workers in the utility function (see Zhang (2004)): ϕWµW (x)−ϕUµU(x)
reflecting the tendency of employed workers to live with other employed and far from un-
employed workers in order to benefit from high-quality neighborhood amenities, low crime
areas...
3.1.4 Wage Determination
Once the match is made, the firm observes the workers’ location, reasonably does not
compensate employed workers for intrinsic congestions (i.e. ϕ = 0) and the total local
surplus S(x) = W(x) − U(x) + J (x) − V is negotiated according to a generalized Nash
bargaining game:
ω(x) = argmax [W(x)− U(x)]γ [J (x)− V ]1−γ (30)
with 0 < γ < 1 the worker’s bargaining power. The equilibrium wage stemming from
problem (30) is: ∀x ∈ Supp(µW ),
ω(x) = (1− γ) [z + (1− s)tx] + γ(y + κ) (31)
where z + (1− s)tx is the reservation wage and y + κ is the outside option. Equation (31)
coincides with the one found by Zenou (2009, equation (13)).10 Therefore, wages decrease
10See Boitier and Lepetit (2014) for another micro-foundation of this result.
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with the worker’s search effort s but increase with unemployment benefits z, the worker’s
productivity y, the cost of posting a vacant job κ, transports costs t, distance x and the
worker’s bargaining power γ.11 The fact that wages increase with distance establishes that
firms compensate workers for their spatial costs, which is a well-established empirical fact.12
3.1.5 Market Equilibrium (ζ∗W , ζ
∗
U , µ
∗
W , µ
∗
U , θ
∗, u∗): An Informal Definition
A market equilibrium is composed of three partial equilibria: a land market equilibrium,
a spatial equilibrium and a labor market equilibrium. On land market is obtained an
equilibrium housing demand for employed and unemployed workers denoted by ζ∗W and
ζ∗U . A spatial equilibrium pins down an allocation of employed and unemployed workers
in space denoted by µ∗W and µ
∗
U . On labor market is determined a labor market tightness
index denoted by θ∗ and an unemployment rate denoted by u∗.
3.2 Land Market Equilibrium (ζ∗W , ζ
∗
U): Definition, Existence and
Uniqueness
Using equations (24)-(29) yields:
ρW(x) = ω(x)− tx− ϕµW (x)−R(x)ζW (x)−
φ
2ζW (x)
− δ [W(x)− U(x)] (32)
and
ρU(x) = z − stx−R(x)ζU(x)−
φ
2ζU(x)
+ f(θ) [W(x)− U(x)] (33)
Given this setup, a land market equilibrium is written as:
Definition 2 A land market equilibrium consists in finding an equilibrium housing demand
for the employed ζ∗W and for the unemployed ζ
∗
U that maximizes equation (32) and equation
(33).
Assuming that, demand equals supply on the land market:13
ζU(x)µU(x) + ζW (x)µW (x) = 1 (34)
I obtain that:
11I reasonably assume that: y + κ > z + (1− s)tx, ∀x ∈ Supp(µ∗W ).
12See Madden (1985), Zax (1991) and Barber (1998).
13I suppose that land intensity equals to 1 and the agricultural rent equals to 0. These assumptions are
standard in urban labor economics. This does not determine the nature of the results.
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Proposition 3 For a given spatial equilibrium (µ∗W , µ
∗
U) and for a given labor market equi-
librium (θ∗, u∗), the equilibrium housing demand is:
ζ∗W (x) = ζ
∗
U(x) =
√
φ
2R(x)
(35)
with
R(x) =
φ
2
[µ∗W (x) + µ
∗
U(x)]
2 (36)
The employment status does not affect the equilibrium land consumption. This is why
workers are endowed with the same preferences. Furthermore, since preferences are hy-
perbolic, note that the equilibrium housing demand is independent of the net income of
workers and only relies positively on the preference for land φ and negatively on the rent
per unit of land R(x). This implies that the equilibrium rent per unit of land is only based
on the preference for land φ and the residential density µ∗U(x) + µ
∗
W (x).
3.3 Spatial Equilibium (µ∗W , µ
∗
U)
3.3.1 Definition, Existence and Uniqueness
Plugging solutions of the land market equilibrium (35)-(36) and wage equation (31) in
Bellman equations (32) and (33), it gives:
ρW(x) = (1−γ)z+γ(y+κ)−[1− (1− γ)(1− s)] tx−(φ+ϕ)µW (x)−φµU(x)−δE(x) (37)
and
ρU(x) = z − stx− φµW (x)− φµU(x) + f(θ)E(x) (38)
with E(x) =W(x)−U(x). This stresses the presence of a trade-off from the point of view
of workers. The latter is synthesized by the decreasing relationships between utilities W
and U and both x, the distance, and µW (x), µU(x) the residential densities of employed
and unemployed workers. This respectively expresses the will to reside close to the CBD
and the will to escape congestion. In fact, workers want to live in the most attractive
locations in order to avoid paying high transport costs, but at the same time, because they
share the same incentive, they anticipate that these places of residence will be coveted
by their competitors. To escape competition, workers are encouraged to play differently
by residing to more remote locations. Put differently, one agglomeration force, related
with transport costs, and two dispersion forces, from congestion in the neighborhood, are
at play. Nonetheless, these forces variously impact the employed and the unemployed
workers. Indeed, workers do not have the same incentives to cluster around the city center.
Unemployed workers minimize their transport costs stx whereas employed workers minimize
them [1− (1− γ)(1− s)] tx. Analogously, workers do not have the same motives to disperse
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throughout space. Employed workers disperse because of rent prices φµW (x)+φµU(x) and
of asymmetric congestion ϕµW (x) while unemployed workers disperse only because of rents
φµW (x) + φµU(x). Thus, the location of workers is driven by their distance from the city
center and their neighborhood composition. In other words, workers are strategic since
they select a residential location in accordance with their preferences and the strategies
of others captured by the endogenous densities µU(x) and µW (x). Therefore, the suited
spatial equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. With infinite number of agents and interactions
through densities, it has been shown that the Nash equilibrium takes the following form:
Definition 3 A spatial equilibrium is a vector (µ∗W , µ
∗
U) ∈M(X )
2 if, and only if:

Supp(µ∗W ) ⊂ argmax
x∈X
W(x)
Supp(µ∗U) ⊂ argmax
x∈X
U(x)
(39)
Comparably to Definition 1, an equilibrium is summarized by a non-arbitrage condition
stating that, in each group, all agents reach the same utility level because the benefit
from living near the city center balances neighborhood composition costs. Such a state
accommodates individuals because they are indifferent and therefore unilateral deviations
of players are impossible.
Proposition 4 For a given land market equilibrium (ζ∗W , ζ
∗
U) and for a given labor market
equilibrium (θ∗, u∗), a unique spatial equilibrium (µ∗W , µ
∗
U) exists.
This finding owes its properties to Propositions 1 and 2. More specifically, existence and
uniqueness are due to the fact that the continuous payoff functionsW and U expose asym-
metric congestion interactions: players’ utilities are negatively correlated to how tough the
competition is. This involves that multiplicity is an outcome of this model if, and only if,
ϕ = 0. Also note that it is sufficient to assume that agents bid for land to end up with the
classical urban model, that is:
R∗(x) = max {Ψ(W∗, x),Ψ(U∗, x), 0} (40)
where Ψ(W∗, x) (respectively Ψ(U∗, x)) is the bid-rent function of employed (respectively
unemployed) workers. Such equilibrium will spawn few city configurations. Namely, a
segregated city will occur in equilibrium where the employed workers reside close to their
job locations whereas the unemployed ones live on the outskirts of the city.
3.3.2 Closed Form Solution for the Spatial Distribution of Employed Workers
µ∗W
Solving system (39) for µW gives:
µ∗W (x) =


√
2(1−s)γte∗
ϕ
− (1−s)γt
ϕ
x if (1−s)γt2ϕ > e
∗
e∗ + (1−s)γt
2ϕ
− (1−s)γt
ϕ
x if e∗ ≥ (1−s)γt
2ϕ
(41)
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∀x ∈ Supp(µ∗W ) = [0, xˇ
∗
W ] with
xˇ∗W =


√
2ϕe∗
(1−s)γt
if (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> e∗
1 if e∗ ≥ (1−s)γt
2ϕ
(42)
Two comments are in order. First, unemployment benefits z, the worker’s productivity y,
the separation rate δ and the cost of posting a job κ indirectly influence the spatial equilib-
rium (sketched in Figure 1) via the equilibrium employment rate e∗.14 This is explained by
the fact that, under hyperbolic preferences, the net income effect is cancelled out. Second,
(a) If (1−s)γt2ϕ > e
∗
(b) If e∗ ≥ (1−s)γt2ϕ
Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of Employed Workers µ∗W
for e∗ fixed, the impact of each parameter on the spatial concentration of employed workers
is well-established (see Figure 2). An increase in transport costs t incite workers to live
14In Figures 1-9, red lines, blue lines and green lines represent respectively employed, unemployed workers
and the local unemployment rate.
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closer to the city center. Consequently, the CBD is more inhabited and the density gradient
is steeper. In addition, a higher ϕ makes competition tougher between employed workers.
This encourages employed workers to escape congestion by living (in proportion) farer to
their job locations. The presence of the worker’s bargaining power γ and the worker’s
search effort s are also intuitive. If the worker’s bargaining power is improved, employed
workers are less compensated by firms for their transport costs (see equation (31)). This
reinforces the negative effect in transport costs and leads to a higher urban density of em-
ployed workers. If s is larger, unemployed workers go more frequently to the city center
and therefore bear more commuting costs. In consequence, they agglomerate near the city
center.
Figure 2: Effects of the Parameters on the Spatial Distribution of Employed Workers
3.3.3 Closed Form Solution for the Spatial Distribution of Unemployed Work-
ers µ∗U
By the same token, solving system (39) for µU , I find that, if:
s
φ
−
(1− s)γ
ϕ
> 0 (43)
then
µ∗U(x) =


√
2
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t(1− e∗)−
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
tx if e∗ > 1−
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
1− e∗ +
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
−
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
tx if 1−
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
≥ e∗
(44)
∀x ∈ [0, xˇ∗U ] with
xˇ∗U =


√
2φϕ(1−e∗)
[ϕs−(1−s)γφ]t
if e∗ > 1−
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
1 if 1−
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
≥ e∗
(45)
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In contrast, if:
(1− s)γ
ϕ
−
s
φ
> 0 (46)
then
µ∗U(x) =


1−
√
2
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t(1− e∗) +
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
tx if e∗ > 1−
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
1− e∗ +
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
+
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
x if 1−
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
≥ e∗
(47)
∀x ∈ [xˇ∗U , 1] with
xˇ∗U =


√
2φϕ(1−e∗)
[(1−s)γφ−ϕs]t
if e∗ > 1−
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
0 if 1−
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
≥ e∗
(48)
Figure 3 and Figure 4 descibe the behavior of equations (43)-(48). The first comment
(a) If s
φ
−
(1−s)γ
ϕ
> 0 and e∗ > 1−
[
s
φ
−
(1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
(b) If (1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
> 0 and e∗ > 1−
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
(c) If s
φ
−
(1−s)γ
ϕ
> 0 and 1−
[
s
φ
−
(1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
≥ e∗ (d) If (1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
> 0 and 1−
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
≥ e∗
Figure 3: Spatial Distribution of Unemployed Workers µ∗U
made in the previous section also applies here. Another interesting result lies in the con-
nection of µ∗U and distance to jobs x: the unemployed workers’ distribution can decrease
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or counter-intuitively increase with respect to distance. The predominance of one of these
two situations is determined by condition (43) that captures the relative agglomeration and
dispersion forces of workers. It particularly states the interdependence between the location
of employed workers and the location of unemployed ones: s
φ
can be viewed as the relative
incentive of unemployed workers, while (1−s)γ
ϕ
can be interpreted as the relative motive of
employed ones. In fact, the worker’s bargaining power γ, the worker’s search effort s and
the specific congestion effect ϕ play similar roles found in Section 3.3.2. If γ is high, s and
ϕ are low enough, the employed concentrate near the CBD and the unemployed flee the
center to live on the outskirts. Furthermore, when the preference for land φ is high, workers
want to increase their housing consumptions. Because the land supply is fixed, they know
that if they reside in dense areas, the land prices will be high and they will not be able to
achieve their willingness to live in large dwellings. This phenomenon exhorts workers to
disperse: the unemployed desert areas where employed workers stay. Last, transport costs
t only magnify the previously mentioned forces.
Figure 4: Effects of the Parameters on the Spatial Distribution of Unemployed Workers
19
3.4 Unemployment Dispersion and City Configurations
Let u(x) be the local unemployment rate defined as:
u(x) =
µ∗U(x)
µ∗U(x) + µ
∗
W (x)
(49)
Combining results outlined in Section 3.3 and definition (49), it turns out that the model
generates many different levels of unemployment dispersion. For clarity of exposition, I
rank this large heterogeneity into 5 patterns and 6 sub-patterns:
(i)- a city is said to be purely integrated if both groups of workers live together and
in the same proportions. Thereby, the local unemployment rate is uniformly distributed
throughout space (see Figure 5).
(a) If C1a holds (b) If C1b holds
Figure 5: Examples of Purely Integrated Cities
(ii)- a city is segregated if populations of workers get separated into two different parts
of the city, that is, if the distribution of the local unemployment rate is degenerated. Thus,
there are only two local unemployment rates in the economy: either 0% or 100%. Because
of the fact that spatial distribution of employed workers always decreases with respect to
jobs, the developed framework only supports a situation where the employed live close to
jobs and the unemployed reside at the fringes of the city (see Figure 6).
(iii)- a city is said to be integrated when employed and unemployed workers share
the same place of residence but in different proportions. Based on this feature, the local
unemployment rate is continuously (but non-uniformly) dispersed over space (see Figure 7).
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Figure 6: Example of Segregated Cities
(a) If C3a holds (b) If C3b holds
Figure 7: Examples of Integrated Cities
(iv)- a city is incompletely and purely integrated if the local unemployment rate is uni-
formly diffused into a part of the space, whereas in other zones of the city, it is degenerated
(see Figure 8). Two sub-patterns can be pointed out: a situation where the city exposes a
segregated are of unemployed (see Figure 8a) or of employed workers (See Figure 8b).
(v)- a city is said to be incompletely integrated (or incompletely segregated) if the local
unemployment rate is continuously diffused into a zone of the city while in other areas,
it is degenerated. Four sub-patterns can be underlined: a central core of employed work-
ers surrounded by a peripheral integrated ring of workers (see Figure 9a), a central core
of mixed workers surrounded by a peripheral segregated part of the employed (see Fig-
ures 9b-9c) or the unemployed (see Figure 9d-9f) and both a central core and a peripheral
ring of segregated areas separated by an intermediate ring of mixed workers (see Figure 9g).
The prevalence of one these city configurations hinges on the relative size of agglomera-
tion and dispersion forces (i.e. comparing the slopes of the spatial distributions of workers).
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(a) If C4a holds (b) If C4b holds
Figure 8: Examples of Incompletely and Purely Integrated Cities
(a) If C5a holds (b) If C5b holds (c) If C5c holds
(d) If C5d holds (e) If C5e holds (f) If C5f holds (g) If C5g holds
Figure 9: Examples of Incompletely Integrated Cities
Indeed, a deeper analysis of equations (42)-(49) yields:
Proposition 5 For a given market equilibrium (ζ∗W , ζ
∗
U , µ
∗
W , µ
∗
U , θ
∗, u∗), if:
C1a: e∗ = 1
2
, (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> 1
2
> 1− (1−s)γt
2ϕ
and s
φ
= 2(1−s)γ
ϕ
then the city is purely integrated
(see Figure 5a).
C1b: e∗ = 1
2
, 1
2
≥ (1−s)γt
2ϕ
, 1 − (1−s)γt
2ϕ
≥ 1
2
and s
φ
= 2(1−s)γ
ϕ
then the city is purely
integrated (see Figure 5b).
C2: (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> e∗ > 1 −
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
and (1−s)γφ
2(1−s)φ−ϕs
≥ e∗ then the city is segregated
(see Figure 6).
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C3a: e∗ ≥ (1−s)γt
2ϕ
, s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
> 0 and 1−
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
≥ e∗ then the city is integrated
(see Figure 7.a).
C3b: e∗ ≥ (1−s)γt
2ϕ
, (1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
> 0 and 1−
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
≥ e∗ then the city is integrated
(see Figure 7.b).
C4a: e∗ < 1
2
and s
φ
= 2(1−s)t
ϕ
then the city is incompletely and purely integrated (see
Figure 8a).
C4b: e∗ > 1
2
and s
φ
= 2(1−s)t
ϕ
then the city is incompletely and purely integrated (see
Figure 8b).
C5a: e∗ ≥ (1−s)γt
2ϕ
and e∗ > 1 −
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
then the city is incompletely integrated
(see Figure 9a).
C5b: (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> e∗ > 1 −
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
and e∗ > (1−s)γφ
ϕs
then the city is incompletely
integrated (see Figure 9b).
C5c: e∗ ≥ (1−s)γt
2ϕ
and e∗ > 1 −
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
then the city is incompletely integrated
(see Figure 9c).
C5d: (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> e∗ > 1 −
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
and e∗ < (1−s)γφ
ϕs
then the city is incompletely
integrated (see Figure 9d).
C5e: (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> e∗, (1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
> 0 and 1 −
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
≥ e∗ then the city is incom-
pletely integrated (see Figure 9e).
C5f: (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> e∗, s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
> 0 and e∗ > 1 −
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
then the city is incom-
pletely integrated (see Figure 9f).
C5g: (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> e∗ > 1−
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
and e∗ > (1−s)γφ
2(1−s)γφ−sϕ
then the city is incompletely
integrated (See Figure 9g).
What is appealing is that very simple analytical conditions for the 11 different urban
situations are obtained. This shows that the present model is able to explain why cities
are different in terms of unemployment disparities with parsimonious parameters. Namely,
purely integrated and incompletely integrated cities emerge when the relative incentive
of employed workers (1−s)γ
ϕ
is two times higher than the one of unemployed workers s
φ
.
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Segregated cities or incompletely integrated cities that converge towards segregated cities
(i.e. Figure 9d) exist if the bargaining power γ, transport costs t and preferences for land
φ and if search effort s and competition between employed workers ϕ are low. On the
contrary, integrated cities prevail if agglomeration forces are weak (i.e. γ, t low and s
large) and dispersion forces are strong (φ and ϕ large). Incompletely integrated cities are
a go between segregated and integrated cities.
3.5 Labor Market Equilibrium (θ∗, u∗)
Let me close now the model by computing e∗ the equilibrium employment rate of the city.
3.5.1 Modified Beveridge Curve
The dynamics of the global unemployment rate u is:
u˙ =
∫
Supp(µ∗W )
δµ∗W (x)dx−
∫
Supp(µ∗U )
f(θ)µ∗U(x)dx = δ(1− u)− f(θ)u (50)
with u˙ the variation of unemployment with respect to time, δ(1 − u) is the number of
employed workers entering unemployment and f(θ)u is the number of unemployed workers
finding a job. In steady state, the flows are equal so that:
u =
δ
δ + f(θ)
=
δ
δ + sθq(θ)
(51)
Equation (51) is referred as the modified Beveridge curve. As in Pissarides (2000), this
curve shows an inverse relationship between the unemployment rate u and the vacancy rate
u and the unemployment rate u increases with the separation rate δ. Similarly to Zenou
(2009b), an increase in search efforts s lowers unemployment.
3.5.2 Average Wage Equation
Unproductive firms do not know the location of their future workers when they post their
vacancies but make their decisions by expecting the average wage denoted by ω and defined
as:
ω =
1
e∗
∫
Supp(µ∗W )
ω∗(x)µ∗W (x)dx (52)
or, using equilibrium wage equation (31) and equilibrium spatial distribution (41):
ω =


(1− γ)
[
z + 1
3
√
2(1−s)ϕte∗
γ
]
+ γ(y + κ) if (1−s)t2ϕ > e
∗
(1− γ)
[
z + (1− s)t
(
1
2
− (1−s)γt
12φe∗
)]
+ γ(y + κ) if e∗ ≥ (1−s)t
2ϕ
(53)
Unemployed benefits z, the worker’s productivity y and the cost of a vacancy κ share the
same role on the average wage ω than on the wage equation ω(x). The worker’s bargaining
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γ has a positive impact on the average wage if, and only if, y + κ > z + (1 − s)t∂x
∂γ
. The
average wage is improved by transport costs t, the congestion effect ϕ and the worker’s
search effort s since the latter increases average distance between jobs and workers and
lowers the compensation mechanism previously described.
3.5.3 Modified Job Creation Equation
Let J be the expected asset value of a filled job. This asset value follows a Bellman
equation:
ρJ = y − ω − δ
(
J − V
)
(54)
Using equation (53), equation (54) and the free entry condition (i.e. V = 0)), the modified
job creation equation is:
y − ω
ρ+ δ
=
κ
q(θ)
(55)
This standard equation, stating an inverse relation between the labor market tightness
and the average wage, has the straightforward following explanation. In equilibrium, the
average benefit of a filled job (i.e. the benefit of a filled job multiplied by the expected
average duration of a filled job) is equal to the average search cost of a vacancy (i.e. the
cost of a vacancy multiplied by the average duration of a job vacant). Also observe that the
local unemployment rate u∗(x) and preferences for land φ do not influence the level of labor
market tightness and so the unemployment rate u. This means that the intra-variation of
the local unemployment rate does not impact the global unemployment rate of the city.
Only the spatial concentration of employed workers µ∗W (x) matters with the average wage.
More precisely, urban density of the employed negatively affects the unemployment rate.
Lower density increases the average reservation wage since workers live further away from
jobs. For that reason, the average wage set by firms is improved and the expected gain
of hiring a new worker decreases. To restore the equilibrium, the expected cost of looking
for a job has to decrease too. This leads to a fall in labor market tightness and so to an
increase in the unemployment rate.15 A direct corollary of this finding is that segregated
cities always show lower unemployment rates than integrated ones.
3.5.4 Definition, Existence and Uniqueness
Definition 4 A labor market equilibrium (θ∗, u∗) consists in finding a labor market tight-
ness index θ∗ solving the modified job creation equation (55) and an unemployment rate u∗
solving the modified Beveridge curve (51).
15The reader should keep this intuitive mechanism in mind to understand the relationships in Section
3.5.5.
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Proposition 6 For a given land market equilibrium (ζ∗W , ζ
∗
U) and a given spatial equilib-
rium (µ∗W , µ
∗
U), a unique labor market equilibrium (θ
∗, u∗) exists.
3.5.5 Comparive Statics Analysis
In order to get a better rationale of the model, let me perform a comparative statics
analysis. Results of this mere exercise are displayed in Figures 10-13. Since unemployment
benefits, specific congestion effect and transport costs improve the average reservation wage
of workers, this implies a decline in labor market tightness and a higher unemployment rate.
Equivalently, an increase in the costs of posting a vacancy leads to greater expected average
costs. By definition, this reduces job creation and increases the unemployment rate.
Figure 10: Effects of unemployment benefits, specific congestion effect, transport costs
and the cost of posting a vacancy on equilibrium labor market tightness and equilibrium
unemployment
The worker’s productivity seems to play an ambiguous role: it raises wage pressure, but
it also improves production. Nonetheless, the net effect on the expected average profit is
positive since γ < 1 and an increase in the productivity lowers the unemployment rate.
On the one hand, worker’s search effort improves the finding rate suggesting that workers
will experience a shorter unemployment spell . On the other hand, this parameter lowers
the average wage as stated earlier. Thus, the worker’s search effort has a positive effect on
the labor market tightness, as well as on the unemployment rate.
The effects of an increase in the separation rate and the preference for the present are
the same. This diminishes the expected gain of hiring a worker, the labor tightness index
is lower and the equilibrium unemployment is higher. To loop the loop, the impact of the
bargaining power of workers is uncertain, which is a fairly robust result in urban labor
economics (see Zenou (2009b)).
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Figure 11: Effects of worker’s productivity on equilibrium labor market tightness and
equilibrium unemployment
Figure 12: Effects of the worker’s search effort on equilibrium labor market tightness and
equilibrium unemployment
3.6 Market Equilibrium: (ζ∗W , ζ
∗
U , µ
∗
W , µ
∗
U , θ
∗, u∗): Definition, Exis-
tence and Uniqueness
Definition 5 A market equilibrium (ζ∗W , ζ
∗
U , µ
∗
W , µ
∗
U , θ
∗, u∗) is such that a land market equi-
librium ζ∗, a spatial equilibrium µ∗ and a labor market equilibrium (θ∗, u∗) are solved for
simultaneously.
Proposition 7 A unique market equilibrium (ζ∗W , ζ
∗
U , µ
∗
W , µ
∗
U , θ
∗, u∗) exists if, and only if:
(1− γ)(y − z) + γκ >
(1− s)
3
√
2(1− s)ϕte∗
γ
> (1− γ)(1− s)t
(
1
2
−
(1− s)γt
12ϕe∗
)
(56)
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Figure 13: Effects of the separation rate on equilibrium labor market tightness and equi-
librium unemployment
4 Conclusion
Although cities show large heterogeneity in terms of spatial variation in the unemployment
rate, the theoretical literature focuses on the analysis of segregated cities where two un-
employment rates exist: either 0 % or 100 %. This is because land is determined by the
bid-rent theory that precludes cases where unemployed and employed workers live together.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, I highlight the main theoretical features of a
general urban model where agents do not bid for land. In this simple model, the allocation
of workers throughout space is driven by a Nash equilibrium. I prove that such equilib-
rium exists and is unique if, and only if, workers’ utility functions display asymmetric local
congestion interactions. Second, I use the previous setting to account for unemployment
dispersion heterogeneity within cities. In equilibrium, many new city configurations can
emerge where the local unemployment rate exhibits different movements. Therefore, the
obtained model easily matches many city patterns observed in the data. I then determine
the conditions under which each configuration can prevail. I also prove the existence and
the uniqueness of a labor market equilibrium and make the connection of the latter with
the spatial distributions of workers.
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5 Proof
Proofs 1-2 are inspired from Cardaliaguet (2012) and Cirant (2014).
Proof 1 Assume that Y =M(X ) and let Γ : Y × Y → 2Y × 2Y be defined by:
Γ1(µ1, µ2) = argmax
µ∗1∈Y
∫
X
A1(x, µ1(x), µ2(x))dµ
∗
1(x),
Γ2(µ1, µ2) = argmax
µ∗2∈Y
∫
X
A2(x, µ1(x), µ2(x))dµ
∗
2(x),
Γ is upper-semicontinuous multi-application with convex compact values. Furthermore,
Y ×Y is a convex compact set of a locally convex Hausdroff space. This implies that, by Ky
Fan fixed point theorem, Γ admits a fixed point: ∃(µ∗1, µ
∗
2) ∈ Y × Y such that: for k = 1, 2,∫
X
Ak (x, µ
∗
1(x), µ
∗
2(x)) dµ
∗
k(x) = sup
µ∈Y
∫
X
Ak (x, µ
∗
1(x), µ
∗
2(x)) dµ(x)
Proof 2 Assume that A1 and A2 satisfy the following condition:∫
X
A1 (x, µ
∗
1(x), µ
∗
2(x))−A1 (x, µ˜1(x), µ˜2(x)) d (µ
∗
1 − µ˜1) (x)+∫
X
A2 (x, µ
∗
1(x), µ
∗
2(x))−A2 (x, µ˜1(x), µ˜2(x)) d (µ
∗
2 − µ˜2) (x) < 0
for all µ∗1 6= µ˜1 or µ
∗
2 6= µ˜2. Using Definition 1, it comes that:∫
X
A1 (x, µ
∗
1(x), µ
∗
2(x)) dµ
∗
1(x) ≥
∫
X
A1 (x, µ
∗
1(x), µ
∗
2(x)) dµ˜1(x)
and ∫
X
A1 (x, µ˜1(x), µ˜2(x)) dµ˜1(x) ≥
∫
X
A1 (x, µ˜1(x), µ˜2(x)) dµ
∗
1(x)
By subtracting both equations above, I obtain:∫
X
A1 (x, µ
∗
1(x), µ
∗
2(x))−A1 (x, µ˜1(x), µ˜2(x)) d (µ
∗
1 − µ˜1) (x) ≥ 0
By the same token, I get:∫
X
A2 (x, µ
∗
1(x), µ
∗
2(x))−A2 (x, µ˜1(x), µ˜2(x)) d (µ
∗
2 − µ˜2) (x) ≥ 0
Using the first assumption, this implies that µ∗1 = µ˜1 and µ
∗
2 = µ˜2.
Proof 3 From equations (24)-(33), I have:
W(x) =
[r + f(θ)] [ω(x)− tx− ϕµW (x)] + δ(z − stx)
r + δ + f(θ)
−R(x)ζ(x)−
φ
2ζ(x)
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and
U(x) =
(r + δ)(z − stx) + f(θ) [ω(x)− tx− ϕµW (x)]
r + δ + f(θ)
−R(x)ζ(x)−
φ
2ζ(x)
The solution of Definition 2 is:
ζ∗W (x) = ζ
∗
U(x) =
√
φ
2R(x)
that is
ζ∗U(x)µ
∗
U(x) + ζ
∗
W (x)µ
∗
W (x) = [µ
∗
W (x) + µ
∗
U(x)]
√
φ
2R(x)
= 1
and so
R(x) =
φ
2
[µ∗W (x) + µ
∗
U(x)]
2 ≥ 0
Proof 4 Trivial using Section 2.
Proof 5 By definition:
• a purely integrated city exists if:
- (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> e∗, s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
> 0, e∗ > 1 −
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
and
√
2(1−s)γte∗
ϕ
− (1−s)γt
ϕ
=√
2
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t(1− e∗) −
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
tx that is if e∗ = 1
2
, s
φ
= 2(1−s)t
ϕ
and (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> 1
2
>
1− (1−s)γt
2ϕ
(see C1a).
- e∗ ≥ (1−s)γt
2ϕ
, s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
> 0, 1 −
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
≥ e∗ and
√
2(1−s)γte∗
ϕ
− (1−s)γt
ϕ
=√
2
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t(1− e∗) −
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
tx that is if e∗ = 1
2
, s
φ
= 2(1−s)t
ϕ
, 1
2
≥ (1−s)γt
2ϕ
and
1− (1−s)γt
2ϕ
≥ 1
2
(see C1b).
• a segregated cities emerges (see C2) if: (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> e∗, (1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
> 0, e∗ > 1 −[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
and
√
2ϕe∗
(1−s)γt
≤
√
2ϕφ(1−e∗)
[(1−s)γφ−ϕs]t
, or equivalently, (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> e∗ > 1−
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
and (1−s)γφ
2(1−s)γφ−sϕ
≥ e∗.
• an integrated city emerges if:
- e∗ ≥ (1−s)γt
2ϕ
, s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
> 0 and 1−
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
≥ e∗ (see C3a).
or
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- e∗ ≥ (1−s)γt
2ϕ
, (1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
> 0 and 1−
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
≥ e∗ (see C3b).
• an incompletely purely integrated city exists if:
- e∗ > 1
2
and s
φ
= 2(1−s)t
ϕ
(see C4a).
or
- e∗ < 1
2
and s
φ
= 2(1−s)t
ϕ
(see C4b).
• an incompletely integrated city where there is a central core of employed surrounded
by a peripheral integrated ring of workers prevails (see C5a) if: e∗ ≥ (1−s)γt
2ϕ
, (1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
> 0
and e∗ > 1−
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
, that is, if e∗ ≥ (1−s)γt
2ϕ
and e∗ > 1−
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
.
• an incompletely integrated city where there is a central core of mixed ring workers
surrounded by a peripheral segregated part of the employed occurs if:
- (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> e∗, s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
> 0, e∗ > 1 −
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
and
√
2ϕe∗
(1−s)γt
>
√
2ϕφ(1−e∗)
[ϕs−(1−s)γφ]t
,
that is, if (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> e∗ > 1−
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
and e∗ > (1−s)γφ
ϕs
(see C5b).
or
- e∗ ≥ (1−s)γt
2ϕ
, s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
> 0 and e∗ > 1−
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
, this to say, if e∗ ≥ (1−s)γt
2ϕ
and
e∗ > 1−
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
(see C5c).
• an incompletely integrated city where there is a central core of mixed ring workers
surroundeed by a peripheral segregated part of the unemployed appears if:
- if (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> e∗, s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
> 0, e∗ > 1−
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
and
√
2ϕe∗
(1−s)γt
<
√
2ϕφ(1−e∗)
[ϕs−(1−s)γφ]t
,
that is, if (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> e∗ > 1−
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
and e∗ < (1−s)γφ
ϕs
(see C5d).
or
- if (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> e∗, (1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
> 0 and 1−
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
≥ e∗ (see C5e).
or
- if (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> e∗, s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
> 0 and e∗ > 1−
[
s
φ
− (1−s)γ
ϕ
]
t
2
(see C5f).
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• an incompletely integrated city where there are both a central core and a peripheral
ring of segregated areas separated by an intermediate ring of mixed workers emerges (see
C5g) if: (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> e∗, (1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
> 0, e∗ > 1−
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
and
√
2ϕe∗
(1−s)γt
>
√
2ϕφ(1−e∗)
[(1−s)γφ−ϕs]t
,
or equivalently, (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> e∗ > 1−
[
(1−s)γ
ϕ
− s
φ
]
t
2
and e∗ > (1−s)γφ
2(1−s)γφ−sϕ
. ⋄
Proof 6 I find:
• If (1−s)γt
2ϕ
> e∗ then:
(1− γ)(y − z)− γκ− (1−γ)
3
√
2(1−s)ϕt
γ
f(θ)
δ+f(θ)
ρ+ δ
=
κ
q(θ)
Let g1 be a continuous function on R+ defined as:
g1(θ) =
κ
q(θ)
Notice that 

g1(0) = 0 because lim
θ→0
q(θ) = +∞
lim
θ→+∞
g1(θ) = +∞ because lim
θ→+∞
q(θ) = 0
∂g1(θ)
∂θ
> 0 because ∂q(θ)
∂θ
< 0
Let g2 be a continuous function on R+ so that:
g2(θ) =
(1− γ)(y − z)− γκ− (1−γ)
3
√
2(1−s)ϕt
γ
f(θ)
δ+f(θ)
ρ+ δ
Observe that

g2(0) =
(1−γ)(y−z)−γκ
ρ+δ
> 0 because lim
θ→0
f(θ) = 0
lim
θ→+∞
g2(θ) =
(1−γ)(y−z)−γκ−
(1−γ)
3
√
2(1−s)ϕt
γ
ρ+δ
> g2(0) because lim
θ→+∞
f(θ) = +∞
∂g2(θ)
∂θ
< 0 because ∂f(θ)
∂θ
> 0
The characteristics of functions g1 and g2 ensure that a unique and stable labor market
tightness index θ∗ exists. Moreover, if a unique labor market tightness index exists, this
implies the existence of a unique unemployment rate denoted by u∗.
• If e∗ ≥ (1−s)γt
2ϕ
then:
(1− γ)(y − z)− γκ− (1− γ)(1− s)t
{
1
2
− (1−s)γt
12φ
f(θ)
[δ+f(θ)]
}
ρ+ δ
=
κ
q(θ)
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Let g3 be a continuous function on R+ defined as
g3(θ) =
(1− γ)(y − z)− γκ− (1− γ)(1− s)t
{
1
2
− (1−s)γt
12φ
f(θ)
[δ+f(θ)]
}
ρ+ δ
Notice that

lim
θ→0
g3(θ) = +∞ because lim
θ→0
f(θ) = 0
lim
θ→+∞
g3(θ) =
(1−γ)(y−z)−γκ−(1−γ)(1−s)t[ 12−
(1−s)γt
12φ ]
ρ+δ
because lim
θ→+∞
f(θ) = +∞
∂g3(θ)
∂θ
< 0 because ∂f(θ)
∂θ
> 0
The characteristics of functions g1 and g3 ensure that a unique labor market tightness
index θ∗ exists. Furthermore, if a unique labor market tightness index exists, this implies
the existence of a unique unemployment rate denoted by u∗. ⋄
Proof 7 As y > ω(x), ∀x ∈ Supp(µ∗W ), a unique general equilibrium (ζ
∗
W , ζ
∗
U , µ
∗
W , µ
∗
U , θ
∗, u∗)
exists if, and only if, y − ω(xˇ∗) > 0 or y − ω(1) > 0 that is:
(1− γ)(y − z) + γκ >
(1− s)
3
√
2(1− s)ϕte∗
γ
> (1− γ)(1− s)t
(
1
2
−
(1− s)γt
12ϕe∗
)
⋄
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